NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-

EQUAL PROTECTION-

AGAINST ALIENS EMPLOYED

AS

DISCRIMINATION

PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

NOT PROSCRIBED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT -Ambach

v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).

In 1973, Susan Norwick applied for a temporary teaching certificate that would have enabled her to teach nursery school through sixth
grade in the New York City school system.' She met -all of the qualifications for an educator at the applicable levels, 2 but was not an
American citizen and did not intend to apply for naturalization.'
Section 3001 of the New York Education Law mandates that teachers
in the public school system of the state of New York either be citizens of the United States 4 or make proper application to become
citizens. 5 Ms. Norwick, having done neither of the above, 6 was denied her teaching certificate.

7

I Ambach v. Norvick, 441 U.S. 68, 71 (1979). Intervenor-plaintiff Tarja U.K. Dachinger
made a similar application in 1975. Id.
I Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nor. Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). Appellee Norwick is a graduate of North Adams State College in
Massachusetts, where she earned a B.A. degree summa cum laude. Currently a full time
graduate student in Developmental Reading at the State University of New York at Albany, she
has compiled a perfect "A" average. Id. Intervenor Dachinger received a B.A. degree cur
laude in German from Lehman College in New York. She has also received a Master's degree
in Early Childhood Education. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 85. Appellees Norwick and
Dachinger have taught at various educational facilities in the United States and abroad. Norwick
v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 914. At the time of their application for their respective teaching
certificates, neither had satisfied the prerequisites for a permanent certificate. They now meet
such requirements. Id. However, the district court found that plaintiffs' nonsatisfaction of these
prescribed criteria was not a factor in the final disposition of their application. Id. at 914-15.
3 Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub noin. Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). Appellee Norwick was born in Dundee, Scotland and is married
to a United States citizen. Id. A British subject, she has maintained resident alien status by
residing in this country since 1965. Id. Intervenor Dachinger, born in Turku, Finland, has not
renounced her Finnish citizenship, though she also is married to an American citizen and has
lived in the United States since 1966. Id.
4 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3001 (McKinney 1978).
5 Id. Section 3001 of the New York Education Law provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the
state who is: . . . 3. Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply,
however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher
shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen.
Id. §§ 3001, 3001(3).
The applicable legislation does, however, provide two exceptions to an otherwise indiscriminate ban. Section 3001-a of the New York Education Law provides for the temporary
granting of a teaching certificate for any resident alien who has applied for citizenship but was
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On June 27, 1974, Norwick filed suit in the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 8 She contended that a
cause of action existed under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, because the New York statute denied her equal protection of
the laws. 9 Ruling on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, a
three judge panel ° declared section 3001(3) violative of the fourdenied due to oversubscription of naturalization quotas. Id. § 3001-a. The second relevant
enactment, title 8, section 80.2(i) of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations allows noncitizens to teach when they "'possess skills or competencies not readily available among teachers
holding citizenship" or are "unable to declare an intention of becoming a citizen for valid statitor' reasons." 8 N.Y. CODE OF RULES AND REGS § 80.2(i) (1970).
The Supreme Court, in special recognition of section 80.2(i)(1), noted that "a particular
alien's special qualifications as a teacher outweigh the policy primarily served by [§ 3001(3)]."
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 n.14 (1979).
6 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 71 (1979). Appellees Norwick and Dachinger maintained permanent resident alien status. Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 914-15
(S.DN.Y. 1976), rev'd sob nora. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). To be so characterized, one must hold an immigrant visa and have "been lawfully accorded the privilege of
residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration
laws." 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(20) (1970).
Appellees' classification as resident aliens removed any obstacle a candidate for naturalization may have encountered because of quota restrictions imposed by the Immigration Service.
Were Norwick and Dachinger seeking citizenship status only to be frustrated by the aforementioned quotas, they could have utilized the relief afforded by section 3001-a. See note 5 supra.
However, as appellees did not pursue such avenues, the Supreme Court characterized their
inactivity as a "reject[ion of an] open invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach."
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 (1979).
7 Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 914-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nora. Ambach
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). Intervenor Dachinger was also denied on this basis. Id.
S Norvick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nori. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). Original defendant Ewald Nyquist, as Commissioner of the New York
State Department of Education, was responsible "for the implementation and enforcement of
the statutes and regulations challenged" in the litigation initiated by Norwick. Norwick v.
Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nori.
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1979). He was stied both individually and in his official capacity. Id. In the interim between
the adjudication of the district court and the United States Supreme Court, Nyquist was suicceeded by Gordon Ambach as Commissioner of Education.
9 Nornvick v. Nyqiist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), re'd sub non. Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of anv State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
To achieve use of the federal courts, Norwick invoked the "jurisdictional counterpart" of
section 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
rev'd sub nora. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). Intervention on the part of Taja U.K.
Dachinger was permitted with the consent of the appellants. Id.
i0
Norseick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Stipp. 913, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), revd sub non. Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). The three judge district court was impaneled pursuant'to 28
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teenth amendment, and enjoined its further enforcement.'" Appeal
was taken to the United States Supreme Court and, on May 15, 1978,
2
probable jurisdiction was noted.'
The Supreme Court, in Ambach v. Norwick,13 in a five-to-four
decision, 14 reversed the district court. 15 It determined that the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment did not prohibit
states from discriminating against aliens in the employment of public
school teachers. 1 6 The Court, limiting its focus to one issue, found
the educators' role so imbued with the qualities inherent in representative government that citizenship restrictions were constitutionally
permissible. 17 Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, argued that
section 3001(3) was violative of the fourteenth amendment, 18 an irrational means to a questionable end, 19 and logically inconsistent with
20
recent Supreme Court rulings.
Ambach v. Norwick is the latest link in a chain of Supreme
Court decisions concerning alien rights that has been forged over the
last century. In the 1886 decision of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 1 the Supreme Court first applied the equal protection analysis to persons
other than citizens. 22 In Yick Wo, the City of San Francisco, riding
the tide of anti-Chinese sentiment prevalent throughout the West in
U.S.C. § 2281. This statute provides for a tripartite judicial hearing whenever an interlocutory
or permanent injunction is sought against the enforcement, operation or execution of a state

statute, and it is alleged that such law is in contravention of the federal constitution. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1970), repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976 Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1, 2, 90 Stat. 1119.
Section 2281 was repealed on August 12, 1976, but a specific proviso of the repealer continued
the statute's applicability to actions commenced before the effective date of the repeal. Act of
Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 2, 90 Stat. 1119. The trial court made its determination on
July 20, 1976. Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), revd sub nom.
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).

To date, there is no new legislation which compels the empanelment of a three judge
tribunal when injunctions, temporary or permanent, are sought on the basis of a statute's al-

leged unconstitutionality.
11 Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), revd sub nom. Ambach v.

Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
12 Nyquist v, Norwick, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
13 441 U.S. 68 (1979).

14 Id. at 69. The majority was composed of Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist,
Stewart, Powell, and White. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in dissent.
15 Id. at 81.
16 Id. at 80-81.
17 1d. at 81 & n.4.
18

Id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

19 Id. at 87.

Id. at 88-89.
21 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
22 Id. at 369.
20
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the 1870s, 23 passed municipal ordinances requiring laundry proprietors within city limits to obtain the consent to operate from the
governing board of supervisors.2 4 Convicted of violating this ordinance,2 5 the plaintiff in error contended that he had been unjustly
discriminated against. 26 Justice Matthews, writing for a unanimous
court, determined that because the statute had a disproportionate
impact upon resident aliens, without sufficient justification, 2 7 the ordinance contravened the fourteenth amendment.
Yick Wo prohibited the states from discriminating against aliens
as a class. However, there soon arose a faction within the Court
which argued that the states were infised with the power to exclude
aliens from various pursuits, so long as the restriction actually pertained to "the regulation or distribution of the public domain, or . ..
the common property or resources of the people of the State." 28
In Truax v. Raich, 2 9 the Court on authority of the fourteenth
amendment, overturned an Arizona statute which limited employers
to hiring only a maximum percentage of aliens. 30 The eight justice
22 The need for massive amounts of cheap labor to work on the transcontinental railroad,
and a lack of inanpower generally, caused a vast influx of Asians into the United States during
the 1860s and 1870s. See generally E.

SABIN,

BUILDING THE PACIFIC RAILROAD (1919). The

completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869, however, displaced many thousands of
workers, and caused a major economic upheaval throughout the West. See generally 0. LEWIS,
THE BIG FouR (1937).
24 118 U.S. at 357-58. The ordinances vested the governing board with total discretion, id.
at 366, and were not applicable to laundries built of' brick or stone composition. Id. at 357.
Attempts to circumvent the restrictions imposed upon wood-fralne laundries were effectively
frustrated by requiring all those desirous of utilizing scaffolding (essential to the construction of
brick or stone edifices) to secure a permit from the board of supervisors prior to use. See id. at
357-58. Testimony on the trial level revealed that of the approximately 320 laundries within the
city and county of San Francisco, about 240 were owned and operated by subjects of China. Id.
at 359. Of the total, 310, or about ninety, six percent, were constructed of wood. Id.
25 Id. at 359.
21 Id. at 361. The defendant conceded that over 200 of the Chinese petitioners were denied
permission to continue their businesses, while virtually all other requests were granted. Id. at
319.
27 Id. at 373-74. The Court could not discover any justification for the obvious discrimination worked against the orientals, commenting: "the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no
reason for [the discrimination] exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the
petitioners belong." Id. at 374. See also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695
(1898); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242 (1896); In re Quong Woo (Laundry
Ordinance Case), 13 F. 229 (1882).
2' Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915). See also notes 33-38 infra and accompanying text.
The Court equated a state's right to control areas in the public interest by discrimination against
its own resident aliens with the state's acknowledged right to discriminate against other states'
citizens. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915).
29 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
30 Id. at 35. Arizona enacted legislation requiring employers of more than five persons at
any one time, to hire no less than eighty percent "qualified electors or native-born citizens of
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majority reasoned that the equal protection clause allowed persons
the right to live in any state. This freedom carried with it "the right
to work for a living in the common occupations of' the community. '31 The Court limited this pronouncement by recognizing that
areas imbued with a "public interest" could merit discriminatory
treatment. 3 2 The Truax decision was the major articulation of the
"public interest" doctrine which, in a series of cases, was the vehicle
for restrictions upon aliens' access to various sectors and activities.
In Blythe v. Hinkley, 33 the Court ruled that states possessed the
power to discriminate against aliens in the application of probate laws
absent treaties to the contrary. 34 Later, a line of interrelated cases35
found the "public interest" inherent in the ownership of argricultural
properties sufficient to justify discriminatory practices. 36 The opera37
tion of a pool hall and its propensity to be "harmfil and vicious"

the United States or some subdivision thereof." Id. Penalties amounted to a fine of not less than
one hundred dollars and imprisonment for not less than thirty days. Id. Submitting to the
pressures of possible corporal and economic sanctions, defendant Truax released the plaintiff
Raich, a native of Austria, from his employ as a cook in defendant's kitchen, Id. at 36. Raich
thereafter instituted suit against both Truax and the Attorney General of Arizona, positing that
the statute contravened the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment rights. Raich v. Truax, 219 F. 273,
275 (D. Ariz.), aff'd, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). The district court granted injunctive relief in favor of
Raich, and the state appealed. 239 U.S. at 37.
31 239 U.S. at 43. The Court considered the preclusion of employment oportunities for
resident aliens to be adverse to "the very essence of ...
personal freedom and opportunity"
that the fourteenth amendment was designed to secure. Id. at 41.
32 Id. at 40.
33 180 U.S. 333 (1901).
34 Id. at 341-42. See also Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879). In Hauenstein, it
was noted that each state has the liberty to "give to foreigners only such rights, touching immovable property within its territory, as it may see fit to concede." Hauenstein v. Lvnham, 100
U.S. 483, 484 (1879). However, the Constitution makes properly executed treaties superior to
state law. U.S. CONST., Art. VI, Cl. 2. Thus, a state's ability to restrict alien rights was compromised by any treaty which construed the rights of the affected parties differently. See
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488 (1879).
35 Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield
v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
36 See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220-21 (1923). The Terrace Court determined that a state's interest in controlling the transfer of agricultural lands was a "matter . . . of
highest importance [which] affect[ed] the safety and power of the State itself." Id. at 221. The
Court found discriminatory practices defensible because of the " 'possibility that every foot of
land within the state might pass to the ownership or possession of non-citizens.' " Id. at 220-21
(quoting Terrace v. Thompson, 274 F. 841, 849 (W.D. Wash. 1929)). Such a possibility was
later characterized as "statistically absurd." Ovama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 667 (1948)
(Murphy, J., concurring).
37 Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
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merited the expressed prejudices permitted in Clarke v. Deckebach. 38 The harvesting of tidal shellfish39 and the hunting of wild
game and fowl 40 also merited differential treatment of aliens. Indeed,
public employment itself was classified as "within the public interest"
41
and thus permitted the exclusion of aliens.
The excesses wreaked upon resident aliens during World War
11.42 provoked the first restriction of state power to discriminate on
the basis of alienage 4 3 within public interest areas. In Oyama v.
California,44 the Supreme Court granted relief to a Japanese immigrant's American born minor son who had been denied ownership of

s8 274 U.S. 392 (1927). The Court found that the Cincinnati City Council gave reasonable
considerations to the view that aliens' associations, experiences and activities disqualified them
from pursuing an occupation of dangerous tendency. Id The Court found the plaintiff in error's
invocation of Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924), to be without merit. Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 396. Asakura declared a Seattle municipal ordinance, which prohibited
aliens from operating pawn shops, unconstitutional. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332,
342 (1924). However, the Clarke Court cited the existence of a treaty with Japan which allowed
Nipponese immigrants to operate wholesale and retail shops unfettered. The Court distinguished that treatv from the Treaty of 1815 with Great Britain, which protected commerce
only among nations, and found only the Treaty of 1815 applicahle to Clarke due to his English
heritage. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 395-97.
39 McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876). The relevant Virginia statute permitted only
citizens of Virginia the right to harvest oysters from the riparian waters of the state. Id. at 394.
The Court considered the state's proprietary interest in these mollusks to be comparable to the
interest it possessed in the agricultural lands of the state. Id. at 396. This decision has been
subsequently limited in scope. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408-09 (1948); Manchester
v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 265 (1891).
4o Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914). Justice Holmes opined that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was within its sovereign power to exclude resident aliens from the use
and enjoyment of wild game. Id. at 145-46. Considering the several treaties with foreign lands
which supercede state law, the Court deferred questions of whether the harvest of wild game
unduly burdened the conduct of commerce protected by the various treaties. Id. at 145.
4i See, e.g.,Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
In Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), a New York City statute explicitly proscribed the
employment of aliens on public works projects. The Court upheld the legislation, claiming "it
belongs to the State, as guardian of its people, and having control of its affairs, to prescribe the
conditions upon which it will permit public work to be (lone on its behalf, or on behalf of its
municipalities." Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915) (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S.
207, 222-23 (1903)).
42 See, e.g., Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In Korematsu, the Court upheld the
federal government's right to evacuate thousands of Japanese with and without citizenship, from
the coastal areas of California, and to confine them to relocation camps inland. Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). The government's interest in the national security was
determined to constitute sufficient justification for his confinement. Id. at 223. But see Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944) (war power constitutionality incapable of detaining loyal
Japanese-American citizens).
43 Ovama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
44 Id.
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certain agricultural lands because his father had paid the consideration and held the property as guardian. 45 This type of transaction
46
was presumed to be a fraud under the California Alien Land Law,
which forbade the ownership of farm lands by aliens ineligible to attain citizenship. 4 7 The Supreme Court, however, in a five-to-four
decision, found the treatment given citizen offspring of ineligible
aliens radically different from that conferred upon children of nativeborn Americans or other eligible aliens. 48 This variance of procedure
was without "the compelling justification which would be needed to
49
sustain [such] discrimination."
45 Id. at 636-39. The plaintiff's father, Kajiro Oyama, was ineligible for naturalization because he was a Japanese citizen. Id. at 635. At the time of the ownership denial, Japanese were
among the very few ethnic groups not permitted to apply for citizenship. Id. at 635 n.3. The
children of ineligible immigrants, who were born in this country, however, were not prohibited
the right of land ownership. See Estate of Tetsubumiyano, 188 Cal. 645, 649, 206 P. 995, 998

(1922).
46 CAL. GEN. LAws ANN., act 261 (Deering 1944 & Supp. 1945). The statute created a
presumption that any conveyance of land in which an ineligible alien paid the consideration was
an attempt to "prevent, evade or avoid" escheat. Id. § 9(a). See notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text.
47 332 U.S. at 635. See also note 45 supra and accompanying text. The overall constitutional
validity of the statute,
Court's holdings in a
O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313
ability to denv certain
notes 33-34 supra and
48 332 U.S. at 640.

not reconsidered in Oyaima, 332 U.S. at 646-47, had grown out of the
series of 1923 cases: Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v.
(1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923). All upheld California's
aliens the right to own, transfer and convey agricultural properties. See
accompanying text.
The statutory presumption of fraudulent intent was contrary to the usual
presumption in similar circumstances. See id. at 642. Typically, a parent's payment of consideration for a land purchase and the securement of title in trust for his progeny gave rise to
the presumption that a gift was intended. See id. at 641. Upon those who attacked the validity
of such transfer, would fall the burden of proving that no bona fide gift was contemplated. Id. at
641.
Despite the presumptive burdens placed upon children of ineligible aliens, the California
supreme court discovered no violated constitutional rights. This finding was premised on the
fact that the lands under scrutiny escheated to the state at the time of initial acquisition by the
ineligible alien, without ever vesting in the name of an American citizen. People v. Oyama, 29
Cal. 2d 164, 167, 173 P.2d 794, 796 (1946), rev'd sub nom. Ovama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948).
In Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925), a Japanese immigrant claimed to have contracted with a citizen third party for the purchase of land to be held in trust for the alien's
children. The alien was to pay the consideration while the citizen held the property. Id. at 261.
However, the Court upheld the statutory presumption of non-gift because the presumption of
fraudulent intent applied to any recipient of the property, regardless of citizenship. Id. The
Oyaina Court, however, did not find Cockrill controlling, because it did not consider the rights
of the citizen children. 332 U.S. at 645-46 n.27.
49 332 U.S. at 640. The Court found the only basis for the discrimination against Oyama as
an American citizen was "that his father was Japanese, and not American, Russian, Chinese, or
English." Id. at 644. Justice Murphy, in his concurrence, believed the law "war: spawned of the
great anti-Oriental virus which . . . infected [California]," and was founded in racial, economic
and social antagonism. Id. at 651, 662 (Murphy, J., concurring).
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While the Oyama Court refused to fully address alien rights, it
had greatly restricted state power to utilize alienage as a vehicle to
control use and transfer of land. 5 0 In Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Commission,5 1 the Supreme Court took this restriction one step
further, and eliminated California's ability to deny, on the basis of
5 2 Withalienage, the commercial exploitation of wildlife resources.
out an explicit pronouncement, it rejected previous case law, and discovered no "special public interest" inherent in migratory ocean
fish. 53 Also rejected was the argument that a state could employ
alienage discrimination in the preservation of its interests because
Congress also discriminated against aliens in the classification of
immigrants by ethnic origin. 54 On this point, the Court found the
congressional apportionments, made pursuant to an efficient regulation of immigration and naturalization, totally distinguishable from the
disparaging treatment given aliens engaged in the harvesting of
marine wildlife. 55 Moreover, the "tenuousness" of California's legal
assertions highlighted the need for "narrow limits" to be imposed on

50 Id. at 647.
51 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
52 1d. at 421. Plaintiff Takahashi had fished the coastal waters of California under license
from 1915 to 1942. 1d. at 413. In 1942, he was removed from the state pursuant to military
order. 1d. See note 46 supra. Upon his return in 1945, he was denied a commercial license
pursuant to section 990 of the California Fish and Game Code. 334 U.S. at 413. Application for
a writ of mandamus brought no permanent relief. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 30 Cal.
2d 719, 185 P.2d 805 (1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). The United States Supreme Court
thereafter granted Takahashi a writ of certiorari. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 333 U.S.
853 (1947).
While the petitioner was denied a commercial license, a 1947 amendment to the California
Fish and Game Code allowed "any person, not a citizen of the United States" to receive a
hunting or sport fishing license. 334 U.S. at 413-14 n.3 (quoting CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§§ 427, 428 (Deering 1945)).
53 334 U.S. at 421. The special interest that California claimed in coastal marine life had its
origins in Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914), and McCreadv v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391
(1876). See notes 39-40 supra. Such property rights waned through a series of subsequent cases.
In Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928), it was determined that Louisiana
lacked the power to dictate the handling and shipping of shrimp allegedly owned by the
sovereign. Id. at 13. In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), South Carolina was denied the
right to discriminate against citizens of other states (including alien state citizens) in the assessment of license fees for commercial fishing vessels utilizing South Carolina riparian waters. Id.
at 396-99. The Court, in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), concluded that a state claim
to ownership of migrator, wildlife was tenuous at best. Id. at 434. But see Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519 (1896).
54 334 U.S. at 418.
55 Id. at 419. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 51 (1941), the Court addressed the issue of
state law coexistence with federal law in the area of alien control. It determined that "states
cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations." Id. at 66-67.
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"the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants." 56
The judicial disfavor for alienage discrimination perhaps reached
its pinnacle in Graham v. Richardson.5 7 In a unanimous voice, the
Supreme Court declared alienage classifications "inherently suspect" 58 and required the demonstration of a compelling state interest
to justify a discriminatory scheme. 59 In Graham, an indigent Arizona
resident alien was denied welfare benefits merely because she did not
meet the fifteen-year national residency requirement. 60 The Court
determined that the state's alleged interest in the distribution of its
tax revenues was not of sufficient import to warrant this "invidious
form of unequal treatment."61 Utilizing the thoughts originally
propounded in Takahashi,6 2 the Court again found alienage discrimination of this type completely inapposite to superior congressional att63
thority to control aliens' entrance into and residence in the country.
56 334 U.S.

at 420. The Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment "embod[ied] a

general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'in any state' on an equality of
legal privilege with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws." Id. California's occupational
prohibition was held to be inconsistent with this philosophy. Id.
57 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
58 Id. at 376. The Court characterized aliens as a "discrete and insular" minority for which
"'heightened judicial solicitude" was necessary. Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
59 403 U.S. at 376. For a discussion of the equal protection clause and the various burdens
of proof that apply, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 517-34
(1st ed. 1978).
650403 U.S. at 367. Appellee Richardson was a Mexican citizen who immigrated to Arizona
in 1956. Id. Having instituted suit in 1969, she became qualified for benefits in 1971, the time
of the Court's decision. See id. This did not moot Richardson's individual claim for benefits
during the period 1969-1971, as well as the claims of the class of persons similarly situated. See
id. at 367 n.2.
61 Id. at 374. At the outset, the Court noted that the special public interest doctrine had its
foundation in the belief that privileges, rather than rights, could be allocated on the basis of
citizenship. Id. See People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 164, 108 N.E. 427, 430, aff'd sub nora.
Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915). However, such a "right-privilege" distinction had
been rejected in a series of Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 633 (1968) (state's fiscal integrity not constitutionally attainable through series of invidious
classifications); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (right-privilege distinction for unemployment benefits rejected).
62 See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
63 403 U.S. at 372-73. In Graham, the Court concluded that the federal government has
'broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United
States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the
terms and conditions of their naturalization.' " Id. at 377 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. at 419). In accordance with this authority, Congress determined that all
indigents or other potential public charges be refused entry to this country. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(A)(8), (15) (1970). Once having entered, however, all aliens are statutorily entitled to
receive equal treatment tinder the law. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974). From congressional action, it
was inferred by the Court that discriminatory treatment worked against subsequently impoverished resident aliens contradicted federal government mandate. 403 U.S. at 378.
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Sugarman v. Dougal16 4 concerned a New York statute which
prohibited aliens from holding positions in the "competitive class" of
civil servants employed by the state. 6 5 Sugarman constituted an affirmation of the Graham philosophies, but with an important difference. The Court, heeding the Graham pronouncement, declared the
statute unconstitutional 6 6 because it was both over- and underinclusive in its scope, and incapable of withstanding close judicial
scrutiny. 67 The Sugarman Court also commented on the types of
alienage restrictions which could satisf, the equal protection demands
of the fourteenth amendment. 6 8 In particular, it suggested that various positions, instilled with the essence of "representative government," might embody characteristics and qualities worthy of citizenship requirements.6 9
In In re Griffiths,70 decided on the same day as Sugarman, the
Supreme Court determined that the attributes of representative government did not sufficiently pervade the practice of law to allow discriminatory restrictions. 71 The Court reasoned that there was no ra64 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
65 Id. at 635. The classified civil service in the State of New York was composed of four
groups of which only the competitive class had an alienage restriction imposed upon it by New
York Civil Service Law, section 53(1). Id. at 639. Notably, the Court mentioned the existence of
an unclassified service to which no restriction operates. It "include[d] among others, all elective
offices, offices filled by legislative appointment, employees of the legislature, various offices
filled by the Governor, and teachers." Id. at 640 (emphasis added). However, certain other
statutory schemes affected the various positions in the unclassified service, and subjected them
to citizenship requirements. Id. See, e.g.,N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 7 (members of legislature);
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor); N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LA,
§ 3 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1979) (non-elective civil officers): N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001(3)
(McKinnev 1970) (public school teachers). For a discussion of other alien employment restrictions, see Note. Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to \Vork, 57 COL. L. REv.
1012, 1021-23 (1957).
66 413 U.S. at 646.
67 Id. at 642. Declaring the statutory scheme to be "neither narrowly confined nor precise
in its application," the Court noted that the statute proscribed alien employment in both menial
and high level positions. Id.
68 Id. at 647. The Court cited, inter alia, the state's constitutional power to insist upon
citizenship status as a prerequisite to tenure in public office. Id. Jurors, also may be so limited.
See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 426 U.S. 913
(1976).
69 413 U.S. at 647. In the preservation of its basic political community, a state ma pre-

scribe citizenship prerequisites for:
persons holding state elective or important non-elective executive, legislative, and
judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution,
or review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government.
Id.
70 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
71 Id. at 724. Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, had successfully completed law school,

but was prohibited from taking the Connecticut state bar exam because of her alien status. Id.
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tional relationship between the prohibition of alien membership in
the Connecticut bar and the state's proper interest in the character
72
and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.
The potentiality that some resident aliens were "unsuited to the practice" did not constitute sufficient reason for a total ban. 73 Addressing
the Sugarman exceptions, the Court rejected the state's argument
that a lawyer, characterized as an "officer of the Court," was "so close
to the core of the political process as to make him a formulator of
74
government[al] policy."
The prohibition of alienage discrimination in a professional
employment context was firther buttressed in Examining Board of
Engineers v. Flores de Otero. 75 The Flores de Otero Court struck
down a Puerto Rico statute that discriminated against aliens in the
issuance of engineering licenses. 7 6 To continue such disparaging

treatment in one occupation, the Court rationalized, would have allowed "any State to bar the employment of aliens in any or all lawful
occupations." 77

In what has proved to be its last affirmation 78 of alien rights, the
Supreme Court in Nyquist v. Mauclet,7 9 held that New York State
lacked sufficient justification in its concern for the enhanced educa-

at 718. Having to renounce her Dutch citizenship in order to be naturalized, she declared no
intent to become a United States citizen. Id. at 717; see 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1970).
72 413 U.S. at 723 (quoting Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159
(1971)). Connecticut, however, argued that the special role of the lawyer in society was the
justification for the disparaged treatment. Id.
73 Id. at 725. The Griffiths Court suggested a case-by-case determination of applicant fitness
to practice law. Id.
74 Id. at 729. while the Court did acknowledge a lawyer's role as an "officer of the court,"
id.at 728, it noted that such persons are engaged in private employment and exercise no real
governmental power. Id. at 728-29.
75 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
76 P.R. LAwvs ANN. tit. 20, § 689 (1974).
77 426 U.S. at 606-07. In satisfaction of the fourteenth amendment equal protection mandates, Puerto Rico offered three justifications for the ban it instituted on alien employment in
private engineering practice: control of the vast influx of Spanish speaking foreign nationals into
Puerto Rico; elevation of the low standard of living in the Commonwealth; and achievement of
financial accountability for defective and deficient engineering, within a 10-year period, in personal and property damage due to building collapse or failure. Id. at 605.
The first asserted rationale was determined to be in contravention of the federal government power to control and regulate immigration. Id. The second justification ran afoul of the
principle cited in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 35. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
The third reason failed, "bearing no particular or rational relationship to skill, competence or
financial responsibility." 426 U.S. at 606.
78 At this writing, no Supreme Court decision subsequent to Nyquist has expanded alien
rights or struck down state legislation in restraint of non-citizens.
79 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
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tion of the electorate, to refuse alien state citizens equal access to
scholarship funds and other educational financial assistance.80
Moreover, the Mauclet Court decided that a state could not utilize
financial aid programs as an inducement for aliens to seek citizenship
status.

81

In the first application of the "representative government" exception carved out in Sugarman,82 state troopers were considered
synonymous with those "important non-elective ... officers who participate directly in the .. . execution . . .of broad public policy."83
The Supreme Court in Foley v. Connelie,84 ruled that an alien may

be constitutionally prohibited from employment as a police officer because such a position is "clothed with authority to exercise an almost
infinite variety of discretionary powers." 85 Chief Justice Burger,
writing the majority opinion, considered the police a pervasive presence in our society,
87
tive government.

86

and one of the basic components of representa-

In his dissent, Justice Marshall, questioned the majority's heavy
reliance on the police arrest power. 8 8 He reasoned that such power
could not be sufficient justification for alienage restrictions when any

person, citizen vel non, has statutory authority to make arrests and
89
searches incident thereto.

80 1I.at 11. While such a concern was considered a "laudable objective," it would not have
been stymied by the inclusion of resident aliens in scholarship programs, id., particularly in
light of the small number of persons disqualified b virtue of their alien status. See Brief for
Appellee at 9 n.4. Nyquist v. Nlauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
81 432 U.S. at 10.
12 413 U.S. at 647-49.
83 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). The Court also characterized state policemen as
not within the category, of persons employed in "routine public employment or other 'common
occupations of the community.' " Id. at 298.
84 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
85
I. at 297. The Foley Court considered police capable of affecting "the most sensitive
areas of daily life." Id. However, Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that neither the police,
nor the military, have policy-making powers; rather both execute the decisions and policies
developed by the citizenry. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86 1d. at 297. The Foley Court emphasized the serious implications of the exercise of the
police arrest power. Id. Because most arrests are devoid of judicial authority, police officers
must exercise a "high degree of judgment and discretion," raising the attendant risks of abuse
and detrimental effect on private individuals. Id. at 298.
87 1d. at 297.
88 Id. at 304-06.
89 (d.at 306. Justice Stevens' dissent further highlighted the similarity between citizen
police and an alien constabulary,' id. at 308, citing the alien's alleged penchant for disloyalty as
.the sole distinction. Justice Stevens argued that if the Court held such a disloyalty theorem
insufficient justification for state restriction of the practice of law, see In re Griffths, 413 U.S. at
717, such a theory should also be insufficient justification for the restriction of applicants to the
police force. 438 U.S. at 312.
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The Ambach Court had only one real issue before it: did the
fourteenth amendment limit a state's ability to exclude aliens from
public employment as elementary and secondary school teachers? 90
Justice Powell, delivering the opinion of the five justice majority, determined that under the equal protection clause the states did possess
such powers. 9 1
The Court's first consideration was to ascertain the true character
and nature of the publicly employed school teacher. Underlying this
investigation was the Court's recognition of the continued viability of
the Sugarman representative government exception in a form
metamorphosized from its simple public interest doctrine origins in
Truax v. Raich. 92 Where a particular public employment satisfied
the Sugarman exception, a strict scrutiny approach would be discarded in favor of a mere rational basis inquiry. 93
The governmental function exception was viewed by the Ainbach
Court as an embodiment of the philosophical distinctions between
"citizen" and "alien" inherent in the federal constitution.9 4
Citizenship connoted an essential communion of thought with the entity
exercising governmental powers. 95 This association was believed to
be of such quality that no mere oath of allegiance or pledge of service
could adequately substitute. 96

90 441 U.S. at 69.
91 Id. at 82.
92 Id. at 73. In Truax v.Raich, the court inferred that persons engaged in public work or
affecting some public interest could be subjected to citizenship requirements. 239 U.S. at
39-40. In Sugarman v. Dougall, it was recognized that "in an appropriately defined class of
positions, [a state could] require citizenship as a qualification for office." 413 U.S. at 647.
The Ambach Court characterized public positions which fell within the Truax-Sugarman
exception as those "bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity." 441
U.S. at 73-74. The dissent seriously questioned whether the teaching profession fit such a
description. See id. at 88-90 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
93 441 U.S. at 73. See also Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 136 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd
without opinion, 426 U.S. 913 (1976). In Sugarman, the Court declared that its scrutiny would
not be so intense where the issues concerned were clearly within the state's power. 413 U.S. at
648. In Foley, it was considered "inappropriate ... to require every statutory exclusion of
aliens to clear the high hurdle of 'strict scrutiny' because to do so would 'obliterate all the
distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.'
435 U.S. at 295 (quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. at 14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
94 441 U.S. at 74-75. The Court considered the differences between citizen and alien as
fundamental to the concept of government. Id. at 75. Notably, the Constitution itself highlights
the distinction eleven times. Id.
95 Id. It was recognized in Sugarman that the state had a right "to preserve the basic
conception of a political community," 413 U.S. at 647, by the exclusion of "aliens from participation in . .. democratic political institutions." Id. at 648.
96 441 U.S. at 75. But see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 725-27.
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Public school educators were deemed to fall within the government function exception because of the responsibility and discretion
they possessed while fulfilling one of the " 'most fundamental obligation[s] of government to its constituency.' "97 Citing a score of
cases as precedent, the Ambach Court posited that teachers were integral to the proper development of a student's conceptions of society
and government. 98 No quantum of standardization or subject
specialization could minimize a teacher's pervasive influence on impressionable students; 99 even the example conveyed by teachers outside the classroom was thought to have significant effect. Section
3001(3) was perceived to bear a rational relationship to the interest it
avowedly served, because barred from educational employ were only
those persons who "demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain
United States citizenship."

100

In his dissent, Justice Blackmun objected to the majority's enforcement of provincial legislation which had its genesis in the reactionary days of World War 1.101 Seeing a clear division of thought in
past alien-rights decisions, he argued that the case fell on the
Sugarman-Griffith-Flores de Otero-Mauclet side in favor of alien
rights, rather than on the negative Foley side. 10 2 The dissent noted
the inconsistency between the majority's argument for a general bar
to alien educational employment, and the four exceptions to the general bar provided by the statutory scheme. 10 3 Moreover, the fact
that these same excluded aliens could by statute sit on the local
school boards which control the schools and their employees, 10 4 in
97 441 U.S. at 76 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 297).

98 Id. at 77. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205-13 (1972); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963).
99 441 U.S. at 78-79. The Court determined that the inherent and ingrained cultural, social,
and political orientation of non-naturalized teachers would defy any attempts to factor out undesirable qualities that would filter through to the students. Id.
l00Id. at 80.
101 Id. at 82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent echoed the impassioned
opinions of Justice Murphy who spoke out against the alienage discrimination perpetrated upon
the Japanese during World War II. See, eg., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
233-42 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 109-14 (1943).
102 441 U.S. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 86-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The exceptions noted by the dissent included: (1)
section 3001(3) which provides for alien employment pursuant to regulations adopted by the
Commissioner of Education; (2) section 3001-a which excludes aliens from the employment ban
who are affected by oversubscribed immigration quotas; (3) all private schools who educate over
18% of all New York elementary and secondary school children; (4) section 3001-a which allows
aliens declaring an intent, albeit unfulfilled, to become American citizens. Id. at 86. Interestingly, such persons need only take an oath of allegience to continue employment. See N.Y.
EDUC. LAw § 3001-a (McKinnev 1979).
2
104 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 590-c (McKinney 1979).
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Justice Blackmun's opinion,
further narrowed the alleged schism be10 5
tween citizen and alien.
The dissent also characterized section 3001(3) as irrational in that
the totality of the educational process emphasized by the majority
could hardly be served by excluding some of the diverse facets of our
society. 10 6 Finally, Justice Blackmun could discover no discernible
difference between the lawyer in Griffiths and the teacher in the case
10 7
at bar, to warrant differential treatment.
The Ambach majority placed an inordinate value on the role of
public school teachers in the operation of representative government.
More importantly, the Court overlooked the real position of the
elementary and secondary educator in our society, which could be
characterized as among the more "common occupations" of our
day, 10 8 falling within the protections posited by Truax v. Raich and
0 9
its progeny. 1
The Ambach holding appears inconsistent with the views offered
0 The Ainbach majority asserted that a state may conin In re Griffiths.11
stitutionally presume that all persons who chose not to pursue United
States citizenship, irrespective of their origin, academic field of
interest, strength of ties to the United States, or willingness to take
an oath of allegiance, are unfit to teach in the elementary or secondary public schools."' In Griffiths, however, a similar argument was

105 Id. at 86-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 Id.
at 87-88. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), Justice Powell pronounced sentiments similar to Justice Blackmun's Ambach entreaties and recognized the advantages inherent in neighborhood schools composed of groups ethnically homogenous. 413 U.S.
189, 245-46. The prohibition in the instant case against the employ of teachers closely identified
with these groups would seemingly be inconsistent with the Court's past perceptions of local
schools.
107 441 U.S. at 88-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Seeing the lawyer in Griffiths as a paradigm
for youth, Justice Blackmun could discover no reason for differentiated treatment of teachers on
the basis of the model influence they offer pupils. Id. at 89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 729). Moreover, he inferred that the oath of allegiance believed
satisfactory in Griffiths to obviate the need for discrimination, would serve equally well in the
case at bar. See id. at 87-88 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
508 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 39. The teaching profession constitutes the third largest occupation in New York, trailing only secretaries and sales personnel. Brief for Appellee at 35-36,
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (citing N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, Div. of Research and
Statistics, Bureau of Labor Market Information of Pub. Workers) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellee]. Educators form the largest block of persons employed by the state. Id.
10' Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 35.
"0 413 U.S. at 717. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
M1 441 U.S. at 75, 80. The presumption of unfitness does not statutorily operate where the
alien declares an intent to obtain American citizenship. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3001-a (McKinney
1979). On the district court level, the state argued that an alien "[bly obtaining declarant status
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885

labeled "unconvincing" and without "'justification for a wholesale
ban." 112
A more appropriate approach by New York would have been the
pursuit of a less onerous alternative that would have served the desired goals while avoiding invidious discrimination. 11 3 Numbered
among such substitutes are oaths of allegience and diligence, which
the appellees in Ambach were willing and ready to take. 1 14 Character investigations would "insure that an applicant is not one who
Iswears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to the oath.' " 115 "Continued
scrutiny" could also insure compliance. 1 16 In conjunction with such
evaluation, subject specialization could further minimize any possible
threat to the state's interest in a proper educational environment.117
The nexus between citizenship as an outward manifestation of loyalty
and loyalty itself is tenuous. Where citizen students need not participate in pledges of allegiance to the flag,1 8 and where avowed communists cannot be stopped from teaching," 9 it appears inconsistent to
deny positions of employment as public school teachers to non-

[and timely completing the naturalization process], . . . has provided objective evidence that he
in fact believes in the American heritage which he in turn is obliged to transmit to his students.'" Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Stipp. at 919. It was argued by the appellees that section
3001(3) swept too broadly and excluded aliens whose land of origin possessed "political and
cultural systems almost indistinguishable" from that of the United States. Brief for Appellee,
supra note 108, at 72. Moreover, to reject aliens of such countries, would be tantamount to
rejection of citizens, id.
112 413 U.S. at 725. See also Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. at 921.
13 See Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. at 920-21. The pursuit of less onerous alternatives
is in recognition of the fact that " '[t]here can be no doubt of the right of a State to investigate
the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools.' " Id. at 920 (quoting
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1965)). However, "the means the State employs must be
precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 653.
See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1965).
114 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 85. It is interesting to note, that while native-born
Americans, many of whom take this country's political institutions for granted are allowed public
employment, appellees, who demonstrate a higher degree of respect for American ideals by
affirmatively swearing to uphold the Constitution, are denied.
115 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 726.
116 Id. at 726-27. Sanctions against inappropriate conduct, on a case-by-case basis, would
ensure that the proper role model is displayed to students. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at
87-88 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117 See generally Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). Subject specialization would allow
local authorities to minimize aliens' impact on students in areas identified with the spirit of
representative government, i.e., history, civics. This, in conjunction with pre-employment investigation, could ensure the satisfaction of the state's avowed interest.
1I" See, e.g., Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 932 (1973).
119 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 610 (1967).
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citizens who profess eagerness to take oaths of allegiance and obedience.
Furthermore, if

"

'the robust exchange of ideas'

. . .

is of

paramount importance in the fulfillment of [the educational] mission,"

120

then the New York statute in question affronts such di-

versity of intellectual interplay. As Justice Blackmun's dissent ably
demonstrates, the student populace would be well served by the
exposure to various teachers, albeit aliens, who had enjoyed a wealth
of cultural and societal experiences unknown to native-born Americans. 121 This interface would be particularly beneficial in the lan122
guage and the arts.
The statute also appears to be under- and over-inclusive as to its
avowed purpose. Private school students, who arguably should be
included under the state's interest in ensuring the absence of
un-American attitudes within the educational system, do not receive
the alleged protection of the statute because they are not within its
purview. 12 3 At the opposite end of the spectrum, the statute is
over-inclusive because it draws within its ambit grades of educational
instruction where impact on political socialization is probably insignificant, and at best conjectural. 1 24 Because section 3001(3) is
"neither narrowly confined nor precise in its application," 125 it is in
violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The availability of numerous less burdensome alternatives further
highlights the overreaching nature of the statute. Moreover, it is an
inappropriate exercise of state power because the "pall of orthodoxy"
cast by this statute precludes the existence of the multi-faceted ele126
ments integral to a complete academic microcosm.
Philip W. Crawford
120 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
121 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 87.
122 Because noted writer Bertrand Russell was an Englishman, he was successfully prohibited

from teaching at the City College of New York. Kay v. Board of Higher Educ., 18 N.Y.S.2d 821
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 20 N.Y.S.2d 1016, leave to appeal denied, 21 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dep't); leave to
appeal denied, 284 N.Y. 578 (1940).
123 441 U.S. at 86. 18% of New York state's student population attend private schools. Id.
Justice Blackmun noted that "[t]he education of ...
private school pupils seems not to be
inculcated with something less than what is desirable for citizenship." Id.
124 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 226-27 (1972). In Yoder, the Court declared that
"there is at best a speculative gain in terms of meeting the duties of citizenship from compulsory formal education [after the eighth grade]." Id. at 226-27.
125 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643.
126 Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. at 922 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).

